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Children being born after the death of their genetic father is certainly not a new phenomenon. 
Accident, disease and disaster can always bring death after the act of conception and before the 
birth of a child. The common law recognises this fact by extending the presumption that the 
child is the ‘legitimate’ offspring of the deceased if it is born within the normal period of 
gestation.1 Rapid advances in artificial reproductive technology (ART) in the second half of 
the twentieth century now mean it is possible for a child to be both conceived and born after 
the death of its biological father or mother (or indeed after the death of both). This has led to 
novel and complicated legal and ethical debates concerning the permissibility of the procedure 
itself as well as the welfare and status of the posthumously conceived child.2 In the absence of 
regulation, there is a danger that the posthumous child will be left with only one legal parent, 3 
affecting both its capacity to inherit from its deceased parent’s estate, as well as presenting 
                                                          
1 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 1 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1765), p. 445; 
R.J. Kerekes, “My Child … But Not My Heir: Technology, the Law and Post-Mortem Conception” (1996) 31 
Real Property Probate and Trusts Journal 213, at 225.  
2 G. Bahadur, “Death and Conception” (2002) 17 Human Reproduction 2769; J.A. Robertson, “Posthumous 
Reproduction” (1993) 69 Indiana Law Journal 1027; C.P. Kindregan and Maureen McBrien, “Posthumous 
Reproduction” (2005) 39 Family Law Quarterly 579; B. Bennett, “Posthumous Reproduction and the Meanings 
of Autonomy” (1999) 23 Melbourne University Law Review 286; N. Maddox, “Inheritance and the Posthumously 
Conceived Child” (2017) 81 Conveyancing and Property Lawyer 405. 
3 D. Madden, “The Quest for Legal Parenthood in Assisted Human Reproduction” (1999) 21 Dublin University 
Law Journal 1. 
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issues as to filiation and identity.4 Although the posthumous collection of gametes from both 
men and women is theoretically possible, I focus predominantly on posthumous sperm retrieval 
in this article for the simple reason that posthumous collection of eggs is a rarer and more 
complicated procedure than posthumous removal of sperm.5 
In addition, consent requirements present difficulties in two different but related ways. First, 
the type of consent necessary for posthumous sperm retrieval is controversial. Some 
commentators take the approach that a surviving partner’s or parents’ request for sperm 
retrieval should not be honoured unless there is strong evidence that the deceased would have 
wished this; while others advocate for much more permissive regimes.6 Consent as to the 
posthumous use of sperm and ovum is also problematic with some commentators questioning 
whether consent to the use of gametes in ART pre-mortem is the same as consent to its use 
post-mortem in the absence of express consent to that specific use.7 There is also a distinction 
between applications for the posthumous retrieval of sperm and applications as to its 
subsequent use. Applications for retrieval invariably take place under extreme time pressure 
given the narrow window in which motile sperm can be retrieved from a dead man. In contrast, 
as gametes can be frozen and stored for many years the subsequent application to use the 
                                                          
4 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, ex parte Blood [1997] 2 WLR 806. 
5 Peart, ‘Life Beyond Death’, n. 6 above, at 727.  
6C. Strong, J.R. Gingrich and W.H. Kutteh, “Ethics of Postmortem Sperm Retrieval” (2000) 15 Human 
Reproduction 739;  R.D. Orr and M. Siegler, “Is Posthumous Semen Retrieval Ethically Permissible?” (2002) 28 
J. Med. Ethics 299; K. Tremellen and J. Savulescu, “A Discussion Supporting Presumed Consent for Posthumous 
Sperm Retrieval and Conception” (2015) 30 Reproductive Biomedicine Online 6; R. Collins, “Posthumous 
Reproduction and the Presumption Against Consent in Cases of Death Caused by Sudden Trauma” (2005) 30 
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 431.  
7 N. Peart, “Life Beyond Death: Regulating Posthumous Reproduction in New Zealand” (2015) 46 VUWLR 725. 
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samples for posthumous reproduction need not be dealt with so urgently. Furthermore, 
posthumous retrieval of gametes implicates different interests than their subsequent use. In 
light of these differences, I contend that retrieval and use should be dealt with differently by 
the law. 
No clear consensus has developed as to the desirability of states’ facilitating posthumous 
conception through the use of sperm or ova harvested from the deceased. It has been banned in 
France, Germany, Sweden and Canada.8 It is permitted in the UK if there is specific pre-
mortem consent to the procedure.9 Similar requirements have been recently proposed in Ireland 
that would impose exacting requirements as to consent in that jurisdiction. 10  
Less restrictive regimes than the UK or that proposed in Ireland do exist, however, where the 
wishes of the deceased can be inferred by other less formal means. In Belgium and certain 
states of the United States, it is possible to avail of the procedure without prior written consent, 
while Israel has by far the most liberal regime allowing sperm retrieval and use at the widow’s 
request.11  
                                                          
8 Tremellen and Savulescu, “Presumed Consent for Posthumous Sperm Procurement”, n. 5 above, at 7.  
9 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990; Q (IM and MM) v Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Authority [2015] EWHC 1706. 
10 General Scheme of the Assisted Human Reproduction Bill 2017. 
11 R. Landau, “Posthumous Sperm Retrieval for the Purposes of Later Insemination or IVF in Israel: an Ethical 
and Psychosocial critique” (2004) 19 Human Reproduction 1952. The export of gametes from jurisdictions with 
restrictive regimes to those with more permissive regulation is a frequent occurrence in the law reports R. v. HFEA, 
ex parte Blood [1997] 2 WLR 806 (where Mrs Blood successfully sought export of her husband’s sperm to 
Belgium); Q (IM and MM) v Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority [2015] EWHC 1706 (where the 
applicants sought export of the deceased’s eggs to a clinic in New York); L v. Human Fertilisation and 
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This article critiques differing approaches to the regulation of posthumous conception in light 
of the interests of the deceased in both the posthumous treatment of their body and in 
reproduction after death. Strict requirements for advanced written directives tend to exclude 
the category of people most likely to benefit from the procedure. They weigh perhaps too highly 
the deceased’s interests in not having his body interfered with after death, to the detriment of 
his potential interest in posthumous reproduction. Permissive regimes, in minimising the 
importance of consent, risk intrumentalizing the dead and using them solely as a means to serve 
the interests of the living. Advocates of advanced written directives, in requiring evidence of 
express statements of the deceased that he would have consented to posthumous conception, 
protect the deceased’s self-determination at the expense of his authenticity, when it is the latter 
value which justifies the former, and not vice versa.     
I contend that a system whereby consent or authorisation can be implied best protects the 
interests of the deceased after death. I propose a two stage system of consent to posthumous 
sperm retrieval and then its subsequent use. I argue that the primary focus of the decision-
maker should be in arriving at a decision that accords with the deceased’s beliefs and values. 
Previously expressed wishes are evidence of these beliefs and values, but should not be 
determinative of the decision that the deceased would have made in the changed circumstances 
of the present. Nor should the absence of any statements as to the posthumous use of his 
gametes justify a refusal of use if such posthumous use would have accorded with the values 
and character of the deceased. Given the narrow window after death in which motile sperm  
can be gathered by posthumous sperm retrieval, I contend that the surviving partner is best 
placed to consent on behalf of the deceased. The authorisation for use, however, should be 
                                                          
Embryology Authority [2008] EWHC 2149; Re H, AE (No 3) [2013] SASC 196 (where the applicant sought export 




determined by a quasi-judicial committee charged with vindicating the reproductive autonomy 
of the deceased.     
 
2. Posthumous Gamete Retrieval and Use 
 
(a) Gametes Stored Prior to Death 
Given the increasing use of IVF technologies, there is an increasing likelihood that deceased 
persons will have frozen their sperm or ova prior to death. This may or may not have been in 
contemplation of dying. Indeed, in one famous case, the deceased had frozen and stored his 
sperm prior to his suicide in the hope that it would be used by his surviving partner after his 
death.12 In other cases, however, it may not be clear if the samples were left with the intention 
that they be used after death, or to preserve fertility and utilised by the person when they return 
from a hazardous occupation or recover from a serious illness. Examples of this include soldiers 
going to war, or when cancer patients are about to undergo treatment that will likely render 
them infertile.13 In a regulated jurisdiction, the reality is that IVF clinics will seek written 
consents for a variety of matters including what is to be done with the material in the event of 
the death of its source.14 In jurisdictions where there are strict requirements for written consent, 
such as the UK, there is always the danger and the fear that due to human error or oversight, 
one of a large number of forms will have been lost, or filled out incorrectly.15 A grieving partner 
                                                          
12 Hecht v. Superior Court (1993) 20 Cal. Rptr 2d 275. 
13 Yearworth v. North Bristol NHS Trust [2010] 1 QB 1; Evans v. UK (2008) 46 EHRR 34.  
14 Y v. A Healthcare NHS Trust [2018] EWCOP 18, per Knowles J at [6]. 
15 Y v. A Healthcare NHS Trust [2018] EWCOP 18, per Knowles J at [6] and [10].  
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is then left in the anomalous position of being allowed to use donor gametes for reproduction, 
but not the gametes of their deceased partner.  
(b) Patients in a Permanent Vegetative State (PVS) 
The question as to whether there can be gamete retrieval from a person in a permanent 
vegetative state is often considered with the issue of posthumous gamete retrieval. As the 
patient derives no personal or medical benefit from the procedure, it is difficult to characterise 
it as being in their best interests and medical professionals are understandably loath to carry 
out such a procedure on an incompetent person. One could argue that the procedure is in the 
patient’s best interests if their previously expressed wishes and values were in favour of 
posthumous reproduction, but this is a sufficiently novel and speculative contention as to be 
unlikely to convince a doctor exercising caution when treating a seriously ill patient, 
particularly as viable sperm can be collected after death.16  
In the recent UK case of Y v A Healthcare NHS Trust & Ors,17 Y had suffered a catastrophic 
brain injury and medical testing revealed he would never recover brain function or 
consciousness. He was married and had a son, but he and his wife had been trying for another 
child and, after struggling in this regard, had attended consultations with an IVF clinic.18 While 
they had discussed the matter of posthumous conception at the fertility clinic his widow was 
concerned that there may have been an error in the paperwork regarding consent and she would 
be thus barred from using his frozen sperm under the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 
1990 (hereinafter HFEA 1990). She sought and was granted an emergency order in the court 
of protection under the Mental Capacity Act 2005. The court considered the retrieval in the 
                                                          
16 Peart, ‘Life Beyond Death’, n. 6 above, at 734. R v. Edwards [2011] NSWSC 478. 
17 [2018] EWCOP 18. 
18 [2018] EWCOP 18, Knowles J. at [5]-[10]. 
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best interests of the patient given his past wishes and feelings as well as his beliefs and values, 
both factors that could be considered under the legislation.19 Sections 27(h) and 27(i) of that 
act also prohibit anyone giving consent under the HFE Acts 1990-2008 on behalf of a person 
lacking capacity to consent. Nonetheless, the court used its powers under the 2005 Act to order 
the necessary consents to storage and use be executed on Y’s behalf. If there was a distinction 
between the consents ordered by the court to be executed on behalf of Y, and that prohibited 
by s. 27 it is not at all clear what this is, and, indeed s. 27 is not mentioned or discussed in the 
judgment.While the court’s desire to give effect to the wishes of the incapacitated man is 
laudable, one must question whether there was in fact a legislative basis for doing so. 
  
(c) Posthumous Retrieval of Ovum 
As noted, the posthumous collection of eggs is a rarer and more complex procedure than 
posthumous removal of sperm.20 In order to successfully retrieve eggs, medical staff must 
administer hormone treatment for a number of days or weeks so as to mature the eggs prior to 
collection.21 One study estimated that a brain dead patient would have to be kept alive 
artificially for approximately two weeks for ovarian hyper-stimulation and the permissibility 
of doing this presents serious medical and ethical questions.22 Thus, it is not fanciful to assume 
that such requests for posthumous retrieval of ova will be even rarer than those for posthumous 
                                                          
19 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s. 4(3); [2018] EWCOP 18, Knowles J. at [15].  
20 Peart, ‘Life Beyond Death’, n. 6 above, at 727.  
21 D.M. Greer, A.K. Styer, T.L. Toth, C.P. Kindregan and J.M. Romero, “Case 21-2010: A Request for Retrieval 
of Oocytes from a 36-Year-Old Woman with Anoxic Brain Injury” (2010) 3 New England Journal of Medicine  
276.  
22 Ibid, at 282; PP v. Health Service Executive [2014] IEHC 622. 
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sperm retrieval, and even where a valid consent to retrieval is in existence it may be impossible 
to retrieve eggs for medical reasons. Indeed, there does not appear to be any documented case 
of a successful attempt.23 There is also the added complication that any embryo that is created 
in vitro will have to be implanted into a surrogate to gestate. There have also been instances 
where an immediate family member has sought implantation of the fertilised eggs.24  
 
(d) Posthumous Sperm Retrieval  
The first report of posthumous sperm retrieval was in 1980, in a case involving a 30 year old 
man who became brain dead after a road traffic accident and whose family sought sperm 
preservation.25 The first reported pregnancy arising from posthumous conception was in 
1998.26 There are a number of methods for retrieving sperm after death including excision of 
                                                          
23 In a recent reported case the deceased’s family secured a court order permitting the harvesting of their deceased 
daughter’s eggs but did not ultimately go through with the procedure: ‘Family Given Permission to Extract Eggs 
from Ovaries of Dead Daughter in World First’ The Telegraph 8 Aug 2011; Jacqueline Clarke, “Dying to Be a 
Mommy: Using Intentional Parenthood as a Proxy for Consent in Posthumous Egg Retrieval Cases” (2012) 
Michigan State Law Review 1331, at 1342. 
24R. (on the application of M) v. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority [2015] EWHC 1706 (Admin) 
[2015] Fam Law 1048 where the mother of the deceased sought implantation of an embryo created using her 
deceased daughter’s eggs and was refused as there was insufficient consent under the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act 1990. ‘Grieving Mum Who Wanted to be Inseminated with Dead Son’s Sperm Meets his Twins” 
www.news.com.au 19 February 2018 <date accessed 17 June 2018>. 
25 C.M. Rothman, “A Method for Obtaining Viable Sperm in the Postmortem State” (1980) 34 Fertility and 
Sterility 12.  
26C. Strong, J.R. Gingrich and W.H. Kutteh, “Ethics of Posthumous Sperm Retrieval” (2000) 15 Human 
Reproduction 739, at 739.  
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testicular tissue and rectal probe ejaculation.27 It is generally advised that viable sperm can be 
collected within thirty-six hours of the death, but in the academic literature there are reports 
that motile sperm can be collected up to forty-eight hours after death.28 Thus, when applications 
for posthumous sperm retrieval come before a judge they tend to be on an emergency basis, 
and the refusal of the application would usually lead to the loss of any chance of procuring 
viable sperm from the dead man for use in a future ART procedure.29  
Healthy young men do not typically regard death as imminent, or something to be planned 
for.30 In one survey of men of reproductive age, under five per cent had discussed the possibility 
of posthumous conception with their partners and a much smaller number had recorded their 
wishes in writing.31 As such, sperm retrieval is generally sought in cases where the deceased 
has died suddenly, unexpectedly, and tragically leaving no written instructions as to the 
posthumous use of his sperm.32 While such requests for posthumous sperm retrieval are 
relatively rare,33 they are invariably tragic, often involving a shocked and grieving widow or 
                                                          
27 Ibid.  
28 A.M. Jequier and M. Zhang, “Practical Problems in the Posthumous Retrieval of Sperm” (2014) 29 Human 
Reproduction 2615.  
29 R. v. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, ex parte Blood [1997] 2 WLR 806. 
30 Tremellen and Savulescu, “Presumed Consent for Posthumous Sperm Procurement”, n. 5 above, at 7. 
31 S.E. Barton and K.F. Correia, S. Shalev, S.A. Missmer, L.S. Lehmann, D.K. Shah and E.S. Ginsburg, 
“Population-based Study of Attitudes Towards Posthumous Reproduction” (2012) 98 Fertility and Sterility 735.  
32 Re Lee (Deceased) and Long (Applicant) [2017] NZHC 3263; R. v. Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Authority, ex parte Blood [1997] 2 WLR 806; Estate of the Late Mark Edwards [2011] NSWSC 478; Re H, AE 
(No. 2) [2012] SASC 177; Re H, AE (No 3) [2013] SASC 116. Maddox, “Inheritance and the Posthumously 
Conceived Child”, n. 2 above.  
33 Orr and Siegler, “Is Posthumous Semen Retrieval Ethically Permissible?”, n. 5 above, at 299. 
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partner with an intense desire for her recently deceased husband’s or partner’s offspring. 
Nonetheless, if one accepts that the dead can have interests, or alternatively, that the still-living 
have an interest in the treatment of the dead, then the surviving partner’s desire for posthumous 
conception cannot be determinative of any application for posthumous sperm retrieval. Such 
applications raise issues about respectful treatment of the dead, and also as to the level of 
consent which is necessary to adequately respect the procreative wishes of the deceased.  
 
 
3. Interests Affected by Posthumous Reproduction 
 
(a) The Deceased’s Interests After Death: Critical, Not Experiential  
The undignified treatment of the dead may harm the interests of society as a whole, as well as 
the private harm to the interests of the family and friends of the deceased. There is also another 
potential harm: to the interests of the deceased himself, either while living or after death.34 
Dworkin posts that we are guided in our lives by two kinds of interests: experiential and 
critical.35 Experiential interests are our interest in doing things for the experience of doing 
them. Clearly, the dead no longer have experiential interests. However, critical interests are the 
                                                          
34 H. Young, “The Right to Posthumous Bodily Integrity and Implications of Whose Right it Is” (2013) 14 Marq. 
Elder’s Advisor 197.  
35 R. Dworkin, Life’s Dominion: An Argument about Abortion, Euthanasia, and Individual Freedom (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1993), pp. 201-202.  
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hopes and aims we seek to satisfy, as they lend meaning and a coherent narrative structure to 
our lives.36  
We need not be aware that our critical interests have been satisfied or thwarted,37 and we can 
thus still have a critical interest in future events that we will never be aware of in two possible 
ways.38 First, we can have a present interest in post-mortem events, including what happens to 
our bodies after death. On this view, our critical interests are not affected after our death, for 
example if our corpse was used in a way contrary to our wishes, but the critical interests of the 
still-living, seeing that their wishes would not be honoured posthumously, would be. More 
controversially there are claims that the dead themselves can have interests in the treatment of 
their bodies.39 Thus, a failure to respect their wishes regarding the posthumous interests of their 
corpse would affect the dead’s critical interests and not just the critical interests of the still-
living.40 Of course, there is the counter-argument that the dead have no interests, and are thus 
incapable of being harmed.41 Or, as John Harris claims that any interests that persist after death 
are relatively weak when compared with the interests of living persons and should be respected, 
                                                          
36 Ibid. 
37 This adopts an objective approach to harm: J. Feinberg, “Harm and Self Interest” in P.M.S. Hacker & J. Raz 
(eds) Law, Morality, and Society: Essays in Honour of HLA Hart (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), pp. 285-308. 
38 Buchanan and Brock adopt a similar division of interests between experiential interests and surviving interests, 
the latter being those critical interests that relate to events in the future: A. Buchanan and D. Brock, The Ethics of 
Surrogate Decisionmaking (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), at 164. 
39 See H. Young, "The Right to Posthumous Bodily Integrity and Implications of Whose Right it is." (2012) 14 
Marq. Elder's Adviser 197, at 214-220. 
40 J. Feinberg, “The Rights of Animals and Unborn Generations” in R. Shafer-Landau, Ethical Theory: An 
Anthology (2nd ed, Wylie and Sons, 2013), p. 372; J. Feinberg, “Harm and Self Interest” in P.M.S Hacker and J. 
Raz, Law, Morality and Society: Essays in Honour of HLA Hart (Oxford, Clarendon Press, OUP, 1977), p. 284.  
41 E. Partridge, ‘Posthumous Interests and Posthumous Respect’ (1981) 91 Ethics 243 
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but subject to the reasonable demands of the public interest.42 Some even go so far as to adopt 
the utilitarian notion that the right of control over the cadaver should be vested in the state as 
representative of those who may benefit from organ donation.43 Even if one accepts such views, 
attendant as they are with all of the dangers of instrumentalization discussed more fully below, 
it is still true that dead bodies have significant value to individuals and families who claim the 
right to consent to their posthumous use. The taking of the body may impinge upon religious 
and personal beliefs and social conventions.44 Respecting the express “wishes of the dead” 
allows the majority of living persons great comfort in knowing that their remains will not be 
treated in a manner that does not accord with these beliefs and conventions.45  
Interests in reproducing or not reproducing, are by their nature, associated with liberal ideas of 
self-rule, freedom and self-determination.46  The dominant view is that we should protect this 
freedom by honouring a competent person’s autonomous choices in most circumstances. This 
can be justified by the claim that people usually know better than anyone else what best serves 
their interests and their choices are thus the best evidence we have of decisions that would best 
protect these interests.47 The desire to protect autonomous choice is evident in jurisdictions that 
require advance directives justifying sperm retrieval and use of sperm, such as in the UK and 
Victoria. Choosing is not everything, however, and Brundy posits that another value—
                                                          
42 J. Harris, “Organ Procurement: Dead Interests, Living Needs” (2003) 29 J. Med. Ethics 130.  
43 HE Emson, “Is it Immoral to Require Consent for Cadaver Organ Donation” (2003) 29 J. Med. Ethics 125 
44 D. Nelkin and L. Andrews, “Do the Dead Have Interests—Policy Issues for Research after Life” (1998) 24 
American Journal of Law and Medicine 261, at 277. 
45J.C. Callahan, “On Harming the Dead” (1987) 97 Ethics 341. 
46 J. Savulescu, “Death, Us and our Bodies” (2003) 29 J. Med. Ethics 127.  
47 Dworkin refers to this as the evidentiary view of autonomy: Rebecca Dresser, ‘Dworkin on Dementia: Elegant 
Theory, Questionable Policy’ (1995) 25 Hastings Centre Report 32, at 33.  
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authenticity—is at play when bioethicists invoke patient autonomy.48 Authenticity recognises 
that beyond choosing, persons also have the capacity to be a particular distinctive self. While 
a capacity for self-determination is not the same as authenticity, they are often evidence for the 
existence of one another; for example a patient’s decision regarding treatment that is 
inauthentic, i.e. widely divergent from previously held beliefs and values, is evidence that their 
decision-making capacity is impaired.49 And, of course we also have interests that may or may 
not be satisfied—i.e. we have best interests.50   
Authenticity underpins the moral force of clinicians honouring questions as to what the patient 
would choose.51 Dworkin presents a similar justification for honouring a patient’s prior 
directive when it conflicts with their present best interests. He describes this as the ‘integrity’ 
view of autonomy whereby we wish to allow people to “lead their lives out of a distinctive 
sense of their own character, a sense of what is important to them”.52 Choices are thus not 
honoured simply for their own sake, but also because they are thought to best reflect the values 
of our authentic selves. As Dworkin noted we do not wish to live a life that is out of character.53 
 
(b) Interests in Posthumous Reproduction 
Interests in Reproduction after Death  
                                                          
48 D. Brundy, ‘Choosing for Another: Beyond Autonomy and Best Interests’ (2009) Hastings Centre Report 31. 
49 Ibid, at 32. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Dworkin, Life’s Dominion, n. 40 above, p. 224. 
53 Ibid.  
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If one accepts that we can have critical interests in events after we die, be they the current 
interests of the still-living or posthumous interests, these can clearly extend beyond the 
treatment of our corpses. There are new interests concerning reproduction that now exist as a 
consequence of the development of ART technology. While living, a person has two such 
interests broadly categorised under the umbrella of ‘procreative liberty’: the right to engage in 
reproduction and the right to avoid reproduction. Robertson describes both of these interests as 
of equal importance and notes that “[d]enial of either imposes great burdens on individuals and 
affects their identity, their dignity, and the shape of their lives in ways that they alone can best 
appreciate”.54 This inherent subjectivity involved in identifying interests in procreative liberty 
explains the importance of protecting an individual’s autonomy with regard to procreative 
decisions. This normally means respecting their self-determination, i.e. right to choose to 
reproduce, or not. Courts have strongly protected the individual’s decisional authority in this 
regard; most notably with regards to abortion,55 where gestational and genetic parentage are in 
issue, and also in disputes regarding the use of frozen embryos where one of the parties no 
longer wishes to become, even at the very least, a genetic parent.56 
Clearly, the individual is the person best placed to know which decisions about having children 
or not, and if so in what circumstances, will best serve their interests in procreation and their 
choices as to whether to reproduce or not are thus strongly protected by the law. After death or 
permanent incapacity, however, the issue is complicated in two ways. First, the question as to 
whether the character of reproductive interests after death is the same as it was before, or a 
                                                          
54 J.A. Robertson, “Posthumous Reproduction” (1994) 69 Indiana Law Journal 1027.   
55 LJ Wharton, S. Frietsche and K. Kolbert, “Preserving the Core of Roe: Reflections on Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey (2006) 18 Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 317.  
56 Evans v. Amicus Healthcare [2003] EWHC 2161. 
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much diminished interest deserving of less protection. Secondly, the dead or incapacitated man 
no longer has the capacity for self-determination.57 If we accept the centrality of consent, the 
weight that must be attached to prior written directives concerning reproduction if they exist, 
and the admissibility of the evidence of a surviving spouse and relatives about the deceased’s 
character and his reproductive wishes both before and after death become central issues to 
resolve as to how to best vindicate those wishes.  
An Attenuated Right? 
Robertson argues that posthumous reproduction can only be controlled in the same way as 
reproductive autonomy if posthumous reproduction implicates the same interests, values and 
concerns that reproduction ordinarily entails.58 As the posthumous reproduction shares only a 
few features of what is valued about reproductive experience he characterises it as an extremely 
attenuated form of the experience that is arguably not an important reproductive interest at all 
and should not receive the high respect granted ordinary “living” reproductive experience when 
clashing with the interests of others. In particular, he notes that the deceased parent will not 
gestate or rear the child, and will never know that he or she has reproduced.59 Steinbock goes 
even further and rejects the view that mere genetic reproduction can ground any right to 
reproduction, as this would create a de facto right to create children with no attendant 
responsibility to bring them up. The central foundation to any right to reproduce is in her view 
                                                          
57 Brundy, ‘Beyond Autonomy and Best Interests’, n.46 above, p. 34. 
58Robertson, ‘Posthumous Reproduction’, n. 51 above, pp. 1031.  
59Robertson, ‘Posthumous Reproduction’, n. 51 above, pp. 1030-1031.  
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an intention to rear.60 The implications of this view for any purported right to posthumous 
reproduction are clear.  
The difficulty with such a minimal view of the importance of any interest in posthumous 
reproduction is that it places almost the entire value of the reproductive experience in 
experiential interests: the interest in rearing and gestating a child and knowing that the child 
will live on after your death. It ignores the fact that there may be significant critical interests 
of the deceased that can be fulfilled or frustrated after death. For example, the continuation of 
a joint parental project where parents always wished their first child to have a sibling,61 or the 
transmission of traditional cultural values of the deceased which mandated continuing his 
bloodline and having grandchildren for his parents.62 Furthermore, the diminution of any 
interest in reproducing posthumously on the basis that the deceased will have no responsibility 
for the rearing of the child is greatly mitigated in circumstances where his parents have 
indicated a willingness to be supportive of the mother should she go ahead with the procedure.63 
Characterising the deceased’s interest in posthumous reproduction as an interest in mere 
genetic continuity is misleading in circumstances where his extended family intend to provide 
a supportive and loving environment in which the child can be nurtured, and in which the 
family’s traditional values can be instilled in the child.64 A parent could clearly have a 
                                                          
60 Arguably, Steninbock’s contention here could be adapted to justify there being no right not to reproduce 
posthumously: B. Steinbock, “A Philosopher Looks at Assisted Reproduction” (1995) J. Assist. Reprod. Genet 
543, at 549. An analyses of the difference between Robertson’s and Steinbock’s approaches is at: M. Quigley, “A 
Right to Reproduce” (2010) 24 Bioethics 403, at 404-405.  
61 Re Lee (Long) [2017] NZHC 3263, at [5]. 
62 Ibid, at [6]. 
63 Re H, AE (No 2) [2012] SASC 177, at [37]; Re Lee (Long), n. 59 above, at [6].   
64 Re Lee (Long), n. 59 above, at [6].   
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persisting or critical interest in having their child raised in accordance with his or her family’s 
cultural, religious, and household values: even after that parent’s death. 
Furthermore, the interest in genetic continuity is a natural form of  what one author describes 
as ‘self-extension’, whereby something of us can live on after our death and “using the 
deceased’s gametes is a tangible way for people to leave ‘pieces ‘ of ‘themselves’ alive in the 
world.65 The passing on of one’s genes to future generations can also constitute an expression 
of personal identity and family heritage.66 Dying individuals have been known to express some 
comfort that part of them will ‘live on’ through posthumous reproduction, and both Steinbock 
and Robertson’s reservations concerning the strength of any interest in reproducing after death 
will have to be reevaluated as the procedure becomes more commonplace and more people are 
informed of its viability.67  
The Interest in Not Reproducing After Death 
The other aspect of procreative liberty is, of course, the right not to reproduce and to become a 
parent and Robertson values this right equally with the right to reproduce.68 There are different 
types of parents, however: genetic, gestational, legal and social— but posthumous reproduction 
only involves the first of these. All of the experiences of parenthood and as a result all of its 
responsibilities are simply not an issue for the deceased parent who will not have to deal with 
the consequences of having an unwanted child. As to the right not to be a genetic parent, Cohen 
describes a possible harm to the parent as something he characterises as ‘attributional 
                                                          
65 S. Simana, ‘Creating Life after Death: Should Posthumous Reproduction be Legally Permissible without the 
Deceased’s Prior Consent?’ (2018) Journal of Law and the Biosciences 329, at 343.  
66 Ibid.  
67 Ibid, p. 344. 
68 Robertson, ‘Posthumous Reproduction’, n. 52 above, pp. 28-29.  
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parenthood’. Here, society, the child and indeed the genetic parent himself may attribute 
parentage to the unwilling father irrespective of the fact that legal or social parentage lies 
elsewhere, creating a kind of harm by forcing the unwilling father into a social category, 
relationships and obligations that he did not choose.69 Whatever we make of this type of harm, 
it is clearly one which is experiential and would not trouble the dead whose interests in what 
happens after death are critical and not experiential.     
One may also have critical interests in not reproducing after death, however. Although the 
deceased may have wished for a child during life, one may wish not to reproduce posthumously 
on the basis that it would not be possible to have a relationship with the child and the only way 
it could know its father would be through pictures and the recollections of others.70 
Furthermore, the deceased may have held certain moral positions or religious beliefs a natural 
consequence of which would be to be opposed to the procedure, even if his views on 
posthumous conception had never been canvassed.71 He may have objected to intentionally 
creating a child that would be reared in a single parent home. Additionally, the deceased may 
have had no particular objection to posthumous conception, but would not wish to reproduce 
with the person requesting it, normally the surviving partner. If the quality of the relationship 
was poor or had broken down at the time of the deceased’s death; if there had been desertion, 
discord and estrangement the deceased’s critical interests would be better served by 
                                                          
69 G. Cohen, “The Right Not to Be a Genetic Parent?” (2007) 81 S. Cal. L. Rev.1134-1145. 
70 Peart, ‘Life beyond Death’, n. 6 above, p. 734. 
71 Hans characterises those who opposed the procedure in all circumstances as ‘persistent dissenters’ and they 
comprised about 17% of his sample: Hans, ‘Attitudes towards Posthumous Harvesting and Reproduction’, (2008) 
32 Death Studies 837, at 863.  
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disallowing the procedure.72 The same may hold based on the surviving partner’s behaviour 
after the death; for example if she has taken up with an enemy of the deceased or someone who 
has done him harm.73 If, after taking up with her husband’s murderer and usurper, Gertrude 
had sought to posthumously conceive her husband’s child, his ghost would surely have 
objected. 
 
(c) Other Interests Implicated by Posthumous Reproduction: Parents, Grandparents, 
Siblings, Children 
The deceased, his partner, parents, siblings and indeed grandparents may have an interest in 
utilising the deceased’s gametes for reproduction. The deceased’s partner’s interest is in 
conceiving and becoming a parent after the death of her partner. The deceased’s parents may 
share such an interest in realising their dead child’s interest in genetic continuity, as a memorial 
of their child, the continuation of the family line and of course the experience of 
grandparenting.74 As regards the deceased’s siblings, they may have similar interests in the 
continuation of the family line and the experience of being an aunt or uncle,75 but depending 
on the circumstances the interest may be in the procedure not going ahead as the surviving 
partner may not be their genetic parent, and the creation of a posthumous child may interfere 
with matters of family identity and inheritance in unwanted ways.76  
                                                          
72 S. Jones and G. Gillet, “Posthumous Reproduction: Consent and its Limitations” (2008) 16 Journal of Law and 
Medicine 279, at 280. 
73 Ibid.  
74 Simana, ‘Creating Life after Death’, n. 63 above, p. 350.  
75 Re Lee (Deceased) [2017] NZHC 3263; Re H, AE (No 2) [2012] SASC 177.  
76 Hecht v. Superior Court (1986), n. 13 above. 
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The deceased’s parents too may have an interest in the procedure not going ahead where, for 
instance, they believe that the deceased would have been opposed to it for any of the reasons 
already discussed. And, of course any consideration of the interests of the resulting child is 
ultimately unhelpful as a hypothetical child has no current interests, and because of the ‘non-
identity’ problem, we must assume that the child’s best interest would be in being born, except 
perhaps in the most extreme cases of disability.77 Nonetheless, there may be a social interest in 
not allowing children to be born in disadvantaged and dependent circumstances.  
(d) Interests in the Body  
When sperm retrieval is sought after death, the immediate question is whether carrying out the 
procedure is consistent with respectful treatment of the dead. While the legal heirs are entitled 
at common law to possession of the corpse of their loved one, this is merely to facilitate burial 
and is not in the nature of a property right.78 Traditionally, of course, the law recognised no 
property in a corpse,79 and although limited exceptions have been carved out from this rule in 
relation to sperm, none of these justify the initial removal of sperm from a dead body.80  
Granting such limited custodial rights over the corpse to the legal heirs serves society’s interest 
                                                          
77 G.I. Cohen, “Intentional Diminishment, the Non-Identity Problem, and Legal Liability” (2008) 60 Hastings L.J. 
347. 
78 Haynes’ Case (1614) 12 Co Rep 113; R v Lynn (1788) 2 T R 394, 2 Term Rep 733; R v Sharpe (1857) 21 JP 
86, 169 ER 959; R v Price (1884) 12 QBD 247; Williams v Williams (1881–85) All ER 80 (Ch); H. Conway, 
“Dead, but not Buried: Bodies, Burial and Family Conflict” (2003) 23 Legal Studies 423, 426-427.  
79 Haynes’ Case (1614) 12 Co Rep 113. 
80 For example, in Hecht v. Superior Court (1993) 793 P 2d 479 where sperm samples frozen and stored prior to 
the decedent’s suicide were held to be property for the purposes of California succession law and could thus pass 
by devise. See also Bazley v. Wesley Monash IVF Pty Ltd [2010] QSC 118; Yearworth v. North Bristol NHS Trust 
[2009] EWCA Civ 37; Roche v. Douglas [2000] WASC 146; Re Edwards [2011] NSWSC 478. 
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in the prompt disposal of the dead, as well as the family’s interest in ensuring their loved one’s 
body is disposed of in a manner that honours the fact that they are the last vestiges of the living 
person. This latter consideration, the need to treat human remains with dignity is protected by 
the civil and criminal law; in particular statutes that criminalise misconduct in relation to the 
dead.81 
In addition, religious and cultural norms may dictate that the body be treated in a particular 
manner after death and what is done with the body after death is believed to affect the individual 
in the afterlife. 82 Medical and research interest in parts of the body can conflict with religious 
values about bodily integrity, and the fact that theological understandings view the organic 
totality of the body as sacred, of inherent value, and to be respected even after death.83 
Prohibitions against mutilation of the corpse can only be overridden in limited circumstances, 
such as for example, if there is immediate practical benefit to another,84 or if there is a legal 
requirement, such as in the case of autopsy.85 These commitments to bodily integrity after death 
protect more than abstract values as the deep anguish caused to families by the events 
constituting the Alder Hey organ retention scandal in the UK illustrate.86 
                                                          
81 See the comments of Heath J. in relation to s. 150 of the New Zealand Crimes Act 1961 in Re  JSB (A Child) 
[2010] NZLR 236 (HC), at [59]. 
82 K.V. Iserson, “Postmortem Procedures in the Emergency Department: Using the Recently Dead Practice and 
Teach” (1993) 19 J. Med. Ethics 92, at 93.   
83 C.S. Campbell, “Religion and the Body in Medical Research” (1998) 8 Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 275, 
at 277. 
84 As proposed by certain Orthodox Jewish Rabbis, Ibid, p. 291. 
85 Ibi, pp. 294-295. 




There is also authority to suggest that the right to possession for burial is a right to receive the 
cadaver in the same condition as when the death occurred.87 On this view, only those dealings 
with a corpse that are to effect burial are legitimate, unless they are pursuant to legal authority. 
For example, the coroner promotes the public interest by investigating sudden and unexplained 
deaths so as to prevent such deaths in the future, and promote justice. Taking custody of a body 
is the first step in this investigative process. Nonetheless, the coroner’s powers with regard to 
the body are limited to pursuing this investigative function.88  
 
4. Regulating Posthumous Conception 
There is little consistency in the manner in which different jurisdictions currently regulate 
posthumous conception. Some countries have opted for outright bans, while others have 
extremely permissive regimes allowing sperm retrieval and use on the request of the widow.89 
In between these extremes, some states have introduced requirements that the deceased must 
leave advance written directives authorising both posthumous sperm retrieval and use. In 
jurisdictions where there has not yet been legislation to deal with the matter, retrieval or use or 
both have been justified on the basis of human tissue legislation and as being within the court’s 
inherent or parens patriae jurisdiction. Some commentators believe that the welfare of the 
living, and not the autonomy of the deceased person should be the primary ethical focus, and 
                                                          
87 Per Chesterman J. in Re Gray [2000] QSC 390, at [18]-[21]. 
88 This was illustrated in a recent New Zealand case of Re Lee (deceased), n. 72 above, where the coroner declined 
to authorise posthumous sperm retrieval when requested to do so, citing lack of jurisdiction under the Corners Act 
2006, ibid., at [13]. 
89 G. Bahadur, “Death and Conception”, n. 2 above.  
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argue for an ‘opt out’ system of presumed consent.90 Each of these is an imperfect mechanism 
for the vindication of the critical interests of the deceased in reproducing or not reproducing 
after death.   
Advanced Written Directives  
In the UK there are requirements that there be consent in writing to each of posthumous sperm 
retrieval, its subsequent storage, and of course its use in any reproductive procedure.91 The 
Australian State of Victoria requires written consent as to the use of the dead man’s sperm for 
reproduction.92 There is unlikely to be much difficulty with such requirements where the 
gametes have been frozen prior to their donor dying or becoming permanently incapacitated, 
as they will be required to specify what is done with them in the event of such death or 
incapacity.93 The difficulty with such requirements is in cases where the death was sudden and 
unexpected and the deceased has not had the opportunity to consider the matter and leave an 
advance directive if he wishes to allow his widow or surviving partner to reproduce after his 
death. As the great bulk of the case-law reveals, this is almost always the reason that 
posthumous sperm retrieval is sought.94 The adoption of such strict formal requirements with 
regard to consent thus likely excludes the very class of people who may wish to engage in the 
procedure.  
                                                          
90 K. Tremellen and J. Savulescu, ‘A Discussion Supporting Presumed Consent for Posthumous Conception’ 
(2015) 30 Reproductive Biomedicine Online 6.  
91 Rv. HFEA ex parte Blood [1997] 2 WLR 806. 
92 Assisted Reproductive Treatment Act 2008 (Vic). 
93 Y. v. A Healthcare NHS Trust, n. 15 above. 
94 See the cases referred to at nn. 107-119 below.  
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It is also of note in this regard that consent may not be verbal, or inferred from the previous 
conduct of the deceased, thus excluding utilising the procedure even in circumstances where it 
is clear he would have wished for it. By adopting autonomy, which is generally protected by 
informed consent, the legal position is characterised by a presumption against consent with the 
onus on the person requesting the procedure to prove otherwise.95 This is anomalous in that the 
widow or surviving partner will usually be permitted to conceive with anonymous donor sperm, 
but not with her deceased husband’s thereby depriving her, and any already born children, of 
the most natural or fitting parent for the potential child.96 The deceased is also deprived of a 
possibility that he may have desired after his death, even in circumstances where there is 
evidence that he had favourably considered the possibility of posthumous conception.97 
Furthermore, the existence of an advanced written directive as to posthumous conception is 
regarded as determinative of what the deceased would have wanted after his death. Yet, as 
Robertson notes with regard to living wills, the basis of the prior directive is that the patient’s 
interests and values remain the same so that those interests are best served by following the 
prior directive.98 This is a big assumption and the attitude embodied in the advanced directive 
may be entirely reversed by subsequent events. This is evident from a portion of the disputes 
                                                          
95R. Collins, “Posthumous Reproduction and the Presumption Against Consent in Cases of Death Caused by 
Sudden Trauma” (2005) 30 Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 431, at 432. 
96 S. Jones and G. Gillet, “Posthumous Reproduction: Consent and its Limitations” (2008) 16 Journal of Law and 
Medicine 279, at 280. 
97 S. McLean, Consent and the law: Review of the Current Provisions of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Act 1990 for the UK Health Ministers (Department of Health, 1997) 1, at 2. 
98 J.A. Robertson, “Some Thoughts on Living Wills” (1991) 21 Hastings Centre Report 6, at 7.    
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between progenitors of embryos where one party wishes to withdraw consent to their use 
because of the breakdown of the relationship in the intervening period.99  
The difficulty with advanced directives is that they fix our preferences in stone, when in fact 
they are always changing and evolving.100 By their nature such directives are general and 
immune to context. A man who, at a time when he is healthy and has no reason to fear imminent 
death, is opposed to his wife engaging in posthumous conception may feel differently if he 
could have foresight of the circumstances of his death. If, for instance he knew at the time that 
his widow would request the procedure after his sudden and unexpected death to ameliorate 
her and the wider family’s grief, to memorialize him, and to some extent to make some good 
from the tragedy of his death.101 Conversely, a man who has left an advanced directive 
authorising the procedure would likely not have done so if he could have foreseen the 
subsequent and acrimonious breakdown of the relationship before the material would be sought 
for utilisation. Advance directives can, of course, be withdrawn or rewritten but fate may 
intervene and a person may die suddenly,102 or they may not be aware of the circumstances 
that would lead them to change their mind, e.g. in the case of an illicit affair.  That the deceased 
may have ticked a box consenting to posthumous use of sperm some years previously would 
not it seems adequately vindicate his reproductive autonomy in changed or unforeseen 
circumstances. Adopting a regime where the widow can use the deceased’s sperm once the 
                                                          
99 Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992); Evans v. Amicus Healthcare Ltd, [2003] EWHC 2161 (Fam), 2 
100 A. Fagerlin and CE Schneider, “Enough: The Failure of the Living Will” (2004) Hastings Centre Report 30. 
101 B. Simpson, “Making Bad Deaths ‘Good’: The Kinship Consequences of Posthumous Conception” (2001) 7 
J. Royal Anthropological Institute 1. 
102 In Re Edwards [2011] NSWSC. 478, the deceased, who was terminally ill, died in a workplace accident the 
day before he had an appointment at an IVF clinic to leave sperm samples for posthumous use by his wife.  
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necessary consent requirements have been fulfilled does not necessarily vindicate his 
reproductive wishes in every case. 
Advance directives seek to extend a person’s autonomy beyond their period of competence, 
and indeed, their lives. Nonetheless, they only serve one form of autonomy: decisional 
autonomy. The basis for decisional autonomy, as we have seen, is evidential, in that we assume 
that the person is best placed to know which choices are authentic for them and will vindicate 
their preferences and be authentic to their character. This justification is greatly weakened in 
the case of advanced directives as the person is unable to know precisely the circumstances 
that will prevail at the time of their death or incapacity.103 Changing circumstances may mean 
that honouring the instructions in the advanced directive may constitute and inauthentic 
decision by the deceased, i.e. a decision that is ‘out of character’ and at odds with their values.  
His critical interests are thus frustrated.    
Comparative Perspective: Inconsistent Case-Law 
In jurisdictions where posthumous conception has not been specifically legislated for, the case 
law is inconsistent. Some judges have taken the view that sperm removal can be authorised by 
the court within its inherent jurisdiction. This is justified as enabling the sperm to be preserved 
pending an application for its use, a lawful process that would otherwise be frustrated.104 While 
others have held that the inherent jurisdiction and the parens patriae in particular could not be 
exercisable in relation to a dead body: being limited to questions of custody, guardianship and 
the welfare of children as well as the protection of property in a charitable trust.105Indeed, it 
has been held that procedures that are not necessary to preserve the life and mental and physical 
                                                          
103 Robertson, ‘Second Thoughts on Living Wills’, n. 95 above, p. 7. 
104 Re Lee [2017], n. 72 above, at [100]. Re H, AE (No 2) [2012]   
105 Per Chesterman J. in Re Gray [2000], n 84, above, at [10]. 
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wellbeing of a comatose man should not be authorised by the court under parens patriae.106 A 
finding that the extracted semen is property (as work and skill has been applied to it in the 
extraction and preservation107) has been used to justify the vesting of the deceased’s sperm in 
the widow,108 and also dismissed as unhelpful and incongruous view of the law,109 and a 
paradigm that ‘bears little resemblance to the desire to create a human being and to nurture the 
person in a particular relationship’.110 In two recent similar cases consent to the extraction of 
sperm pursuant to legislation governing the mentally incapacitated was deemed inappropriate 
by an Australian court,111 but permitted by a UK court.112 
In some jurisdictions, removal of semen has been authorised by the courts pursuant to their 
human tissue legislation,113 while others spurn such an approach and use the fact that their 
                                                          
106 Per O’Keefe J.in MAW v. Western Sydney Area Health Service [2000] NSWSC 358. See also the comments 
of Fagan J. in Chapman v. South Eastern Sydney Local Health District [2018] NSWSC 1231, at [21]. 
107 Doodeward v. Spence [1908] 6 CLR 40. 
108 Re Edwards (2011) , n. 36 above; Chapman, n. 103 above; Bazley v. Monash IVF [2010] QSC 118; Hecht, n. 
13 above. 
109 Re Lee [2017], n. 72 above, at [84] 
110 per Muir J. in Baker v. Queensland [2003] QSC 2. 
111 Chapman v. South Eastern Sydney Local Health District [2018] NSWSC 1231. The application was pursuant 
to the Guardianship Act 1987.  
112 Y v. A Healthcare NHS Trust [2018] EWCOP 18. The application was made under the UK Mental Capacity 
Act 2005.  
113 S v. Minister for Health [2008] WASC 262, applying the Human Tissue and Transplant Act 1982 (WA); See 
also AB v. Attorney General for the State of Victoria [2005] VSC 180 and Y v. Austin Health [2005] VSC 427. 
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human tissue acts predate ART to justify a finding that posthumous gamete retrieval is beyond 
the scope of those provisions.114  
Invariably, these cases consider the quality of the deceased’s relationship with the requesting 
partner as well as any reproductive plans that they may have had prior to date. It is perhaps in 
weighing the relevance of these factors that the true inconsistency, and the need for clear 
policymaking, lies. Evidence that the couple intended to have children together during the life 
of the deceased, including the desire for a sibling for an existing child and engagement with an 
IVF clinic has been deemed sufficient to justify authorising the procedure in a number of 
cases.115 In two cases where posthumous sperm retrieval was refused, the fact that the deceased 
had not averred to the possibility of having children after death was inter alia a reason for 
refusing the request for posthumous sperm retrieval, even in circumstances where there was 
evidence that the deceased had wanted a sibling for an existing child.116 The best interests of 
the child to be born have been used to justify granting the order,117 and also its refusal.118 The 
interests of the extended family have also been considered in these cases, including any 
objections to the procedure and any cultural barriers for or against posthumous conception,119 
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as has possible detrimental effects having the child would have on the wife’s ability to process 
grief and move on with her life.120 
In all of this case-law it is impossible to divine any consistent approach as to the relative 
importance that should be attached to each of the parties’ interests. Are we seeking to imply 
the consent of the deceased, or are we balancing all of the affected interests, namely, of the 
deceased, the surviving partner, extended family and resulting child? If, as is my contention, 
we should be seeking to vindicate the critical interests of the deceased in reproducing or not 
reproducing, there is a danger that this purpose will be lost in the uncertainty until the law is 
clarified. Indeed, there is a danger that his critical interests will be disregarded altogether. In 
the recent case of Chapman v. SESLHD121 Fagan J. held that an unconscious patient who would 
never recover consciousness could not benefit from the sperm removal procedure as he would 
never experience the physical and emotional aspects of parenthood. Thus, the procedure could 
only be for his widow’s benefit and was thus unlawful.122 This definition of the deceased’s 
interests in purely experiential terms was in circumstances where the court acknowledged that 
the relationship between the spouses was strong and the unconscious man would likely have 
consented had he ever recovered.123 It had the effect of frustrating the critical interests of the 
dead man, as well as the secondary interests of the spouse in engaging in the procedure.  
 
Presumed Consent and Instrumentalization  
                                                          
120 Per Muir J. in Baker v. Queensland [2003], n 112 above. 
121 n. 111 above.   
122 Chapman, n. 111 above,  at [37] 
123 Ibid.  
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Tremellen and Savulescu view the extraction, and by implication, the subsequent use, of sperm 
without explicit prior consent as ethically justifiable for three reasons; first, many countries 
already allow organ donation in the absence of such explicit consent, by the family giving their 
proxy consent or sometimes, under ‘opt-out’ systems, their consent is presumed. In their view, 
such organ donation does not benefit the dead, and the practice of sperm retrieval is much less 
invasive than organ donation which is already an ethically acceptable practice.124 Indeed, in 
some Australian jurisdictions, human tissue legislation has been used to justify posthumous 
sperm retrieval. They further argue that the procedure can benefit the deceased in allowing him 
to continue his bloodline and in helping his widow and family indirectly benefits his legacy 
after death.125  
Nonetheless, these justifications ignore the material differences between organ donation and 
posthumous sperm retrieval. For organ donation, the critical interests of the deceased 
potentially affected only concern his interest in the treatment of his body after death alone. 
Posthumous sperm retrieval also affects these interests, and even if we accept the view that the 
interference is of a lesser nature than for organ donation, we cannot ignore the crucial 
distinction between organs and human gametes in that the latter contain the deceased’s genetic 
material in readily utilisable form.126 As Carson Strong notes, the freedom to make procreative 
decisions is significant because of the significant meaning that procreation has for persons, 
bearing on concerns that are deeply personal and at the core of self-identity.127 Reproductive 
                                                          
124Tremellen and Savulescu, ‘A Discussion Supporting Presumed Consent, n. 87 above, p. 8. 
125 Ibid, p. 8.  
126 R.P. Jansen, “Sperm and Ova as Property” (1985) 11 J. Med Eth. 123.  
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autonomy is of such a personal nature, and has such serious a consequences for a deceased’s 
family legacy that it has even been argued that it survives death.128  
The decision to retrieve sperm may constitute a much less invasive interference with the body 
after death than organ donation, but implications of posthumous gamete retrieval are of a much 
greater magnitude, being generational. The creation of new life through posthumous 
reproduction has consequences for the existing family members affecting matters such as 
identity and inheritance, as well as for any child born as a result of the procedure. The argument 
for presumed consent also ignores the other crucial feature of procreative liberty aside from the 
right to procreate: the right not to procreate. In particular, with regard to posthumous 
reproduction we are talking about the right not to be a genetic parent after death. Although, the 
deceased will never experience any adverse consequences from the use of his gametes for 
posthumous conception, the importance that we place on the individual making their own 
reproductive decisions and the importance of these decisions to that individual mean that 
overlooking the need for the explicit or inferred consent of the deceased would be 
disrespectful.129   
There are those of the view that the dead have no interests, in avoiding posthumous 
reproduction or anything else, and that treatment of the dead can only harm the critical interests 
of the still living.130 This view of interest has been used to argue for a system of presumed 
consent to posthumous sperm retrieval and use. Young adopts a ‘balancing of interests’ 
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approach and the only interests which can counter the desire for a surviving partner to engage 
in posthumous reproduction with her partner’s sperm are the critical interests of the still living. 
As any system of presumed consent would not go against the prior recorded wishes of the 
deceased, the greatest interest which the still-living could claim to balance against the wishes 
of the widow would be the protection of a person’s right not to have to make a decision about 
posthumous reproduction during their life.131 In her view, the strong reproductive interests of 
the surviving spouse will prevail in most circumstances. A further justification for a presumed 
consent regime comes from the limited empirical studies that have been published on men’s 
attitudes towards the possibility of posthumous conception, which have found that attitudes 
and beliefs are primarily in favour of allowing the procedure.132 Adoption of an ‘opt-out’ 
system would thus ‘nudge’ men into more desirable actions in line with current policy-making 
in other areas such as organ-donation.133 
The primary difficulty with such arguments where the interests of the deceased man, if any, 
are merely treated as one factor to be weighed against many others are that it instrumentalizes 
the dead, i.e. it treats the retained reproductive potential of the deceased man as a means to 
secure the interests of others.134 The most that could be said of any ‘opt-out’ regime is that it 
would approximate the wishes of the majority of men, thereby ignoring a sizeable minority 
who were opposed to the procedure.135 Proponents of this type of system believe that the best 
way to respect the wishes of the dead is to adopt the policy that results in the ‘fewest 
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mistakes’.136 With regard to organ donation they draw moral equivalence between mistaken 
non-removals of organs with mistaken removals of organs.137 At stake, is bodily interference 
in order to save the life of another living person, most often a stranger. While posthumous 
sperm retrieval also involves bodily interference, its goal is not life-saving but life-creating. 
The potential life has no interests and thus nothing to match against the compelling public 
health goals of systems of organ donation and the surviving partner’s interest in posthumous 
reproduction would be similarly disadvantaged in such a comparison. Furthermore, the 
consequences of posthumous reproduction are permanent and generational.   
By adopting such an objective and general standard under presumed consent the subjectivity 
of these men is erased, not just their preferences, but their character, beliefs, attitudes and hopes 
for their legacy are ignored in allowing posthumous reproduction. An objection to presumed 
consent to posthumous sperm retrieval and reproduction on the basis that it would conflict with 
the beliefs of the deceased can be challenged by the fact that such individuals can simply opt 
out. However, the reality is that cases involving posthumous sperm retrieval invariably involve 
the tragic and unexpected death of a young man.138 And, of course, healthy young men are 
generally not pre-occupied with the possibility of their imminent death and even less concerned 
to leave detailed advanced directives governing reproduction thereafter.139  
                                                          
136 MB Gill, ‘Presumed Consent, Autonomy, and Organ Donation’ (2004) 29 Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 
37, at 45.   
137 Gill, ‘Presumed Consent’, n. 133 above, p. 43.  
138 For example, Estate of the Late Mark Edwards [2011] NSWSC 478; Re H, AE (No 2) [2012] SASC 177; Re 
H, AE (No 3) [2013] SASC 116. 
139 S.E Barton, K.F. Correia, S. Shalev, S.A. Missmer, L.S. Lehmann, D.K. Shah, and E.S. Ginsburg, “Population-
based Study of Attitudes towards Posthumous Reproduction” [2012] 98 Fertility and Sterility 735. 
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The reality of any system of presumed consent is that the vast majority of men would be caught 
by the presumption, whether or not they would have wished this had they turned their minds to 
it. Furthermore, circumstances may develop after death, although the deceased will never be 
aware of, that to allow posthumous conception would be a decision entirely at odds with the 
deceased’s character and the manner in which he had lived his life, in essence an inauthentic 
decision. Such a system can hardly be said to ‘respect the wishes’ of the deceased. Critics of 
presumed consent systems for organ donation rightly criticise using the language of consent in 
relation to such systems when they are more readily characterised as permitting organ retrieval 
without consent. They are in effect routine salvaging laws whereby the state can harvest organs 
without any concern as to whether the deceased would have consented or not.140 The adoption 
of such a system for posthumous sperm retrieval would be particularly troubling given the 
highly personalised nature of reproduction and its intimate connection with the person’s dignity 
and identity.141  
Implied Consent by the Surviving Partner 
Strong is one of the few commentators to argue for such an implied or inferred consent 
approach, albeit cautiously, noting the difficulty with conflicts of interest of close family 
members and that the surviving partner and family members could falsely claim that the man 
would want the retrieval.142 He notes the difficulty here is that those providing an account of 
                                                          
140 R.M. Veatch and J.B. Pitt, “The Myth of Presumed Consent: Ethical Problems in New Organ Procurement 
Strategies”, in S. Holland (ed), Arguing About Bioethics (Routledge: London and New York, 2012), p. 264.  
141 N. Priaulx, “Rethinking Progenitive Conflict: Why Reproductive Autonomy Matters”, (2008) 16 Medical Law 
Review 169. 
142 C. Strong, ‘Ethical and Legal Aspects of Sperm Retrieval after Death or Persistent Vegetative State’ (1999) 
27 Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 347. The others are M. Spriggs, ‘Woman Wants Dead Fiancé’s Baby: 
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the man’s wishes have a conflict of interest, for instance the wife’s claim that her husband 
would want the child may be based on her own desire to have the child, and the other family 
members may be biased by their own interests and concerns for the interests of the wife.143 
There may also be financial or legal gains such as death benefit or inheritance that might prompt 
a request for posthumous sperm retrieval.144 A further objection to such a consent requirement 
is that it allows hearsay evidence of the deceased’s wishes from those who have a vested 
interest in the outcome, and that there is no method for resolving conflict between family 
members as to what the deceased would have wanted.145 To resolve these difficulties, Strong 
suggests some independent verification exist; in particular a previous explicit statement, either 
written or verbal by the man concerning posthumous sperm retrieval be required before a 
reasonable inference could be made that he would approve, otherwise attempts to infer his 
wishes would be defeated by the problem of bias.146  
In other contexts, common practice is to appoint a close family member as surrogate decision-
maker.147 There is an evidential reason for this as there is a presumption that a close-family 
                                                          
Who Owns s Dead Man’s Sperm’ (2004) J. Med. Ethics 384-388 and R. Collins, ‘Posthumous Reproduction and 
the Presumption against Consent in Cases of Death Caused by Sudden Trauma’ (2005) J. Med. Philos. 30.   
143Strong, ‘Ethical and Legal Aspects of Sperm Retrieval after Death or Persistent Vegetative State’, n. 139 above, 
p. 351.  
144 F.R. Batzar, J.M. Hurwitz and A. Caplan, “Posthumous Parenthood and the Need For a Protocol with 
Posthumous Sperm Procurement” (2003) 79 Fertility and Sterility 1263, at 1265.  
145 Tremellen and Savulescu, ‘Presumed Consent’, n. 87 above, p. 9. 
146 Strong, ‘Ethical and Legal Aspects of Sperm Retrieval after Death or Persistent Vegetative State’, n. 139 above, 
p. 351.   
147 D.W. Brock, “Good Decision-making for Incompetent Patients” (1994) 24 Hastings Centre Report S8, at S9; 
In the UK, a ‘Deputy’ can be appointed by the court to make decisions on an incompetent’s behalf: section 16 of 
the Mental Capacity Act 2005. Although the Act does not adopt a substituted judgment doctrine and prefers a 
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member who knows the incompetent well, is best placed to decide what he would have wanted 
or wished for, although this presumption is of course rebuttable.148 This evidential justification 
is particularly strongly in favour of appointing a widow or surviving partner as surrogate where 
the issue is knowing the deceased or incompetent’s reproductive wishes. Providing the 
relationship is still intimate and conjugal, they would clearly be best placed to make this 
assessment. A surrogate decision maker who is a family member of the incapacitated person 
may have interests that are affected by a decision to pursue expensive medical treatment or 
place the person in a long-term care facility.149 Indeed, it would be surprising if a close family 
member did not have interests that were affected by the decision. The existence of interests of 
their own that might be implicated need not necessarily be a reason to discount their evidence, 
although this does not address the conflict of interest.150 
 
Substituted Consent by an Independent Quasi-Judicial Committee  
Generally, the difficulties highlighted by these authors are evidentiary in nature in that they are 
inadequacies in the availability and quality of evidence of what the deceased would have 
chosen. Implicit in this is seeking to vindicate the deceased’s autonomy by honouring his likely 
choices. There are two elements at play here: the deceased’s self-determination, or choice, and 
his authenticity. As noted, honouring the deceased’s choices is not an independent value; rather 
                                                          
‘best interests’ formula, it allows an assessment of what decision a person would have made as one of the factors 
relevant to assessing best interests: J. Herring, Medical Law and Ethics, 6th ed., (OUP, Oxford, 2016), p. 191.   
148 Brock, Good Decision-making for Incompetent Patients’, n 144 above, at S9. 
149 DW Brock, What is the Moral Authority of Family Members to Act as Surrogates for Incompetent Patients’ 
(1996) 74 The Milbank Quarterly 599, at 608.  
150 Ibid, p. 608. 
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it is given its moral force by being generally the best means of ensuring that actions are 
authentic and in accordance with his character and distinctive sense of self.151 And, as we have 
seen in relation the requirements of advanced written directives, honouring a prior decision is 
not always the best way of serving autonomy where the individual is not currently capable of 
making choices and recourse must be had to previously expressed wishes insensitive to the 
current context or any changes in circumstances that may have affected that choosing.152  
With regard to posthumous gamete retrieval, the adoption of a ‘non-interference model’ 
whereby a person’s body is not interfered with in the absence of prior specific instructions is 
not consistent with a ‘respect for wishes’ model of autonomy which would allow for the 
fulfilment of a person’s wishes when he is no longer capable of carrying them out.153 The 
person best placed to provide evidence of these wishes will, in the vast majority of cases, be 
the deceased’s conjugal partner for reasons already outlined. The main difficulty with the 
systems of consent outlined above is not the surviving partner has a potential conflict of 
interest; rather it is that the partner will be the decision-maker and will not be in a position to 
independently assess the weight to be given to the evidence of the deceased’s reproductive 
intentions.  
Such an independent assessment has at times been made by the courts and an examination of 
the case law in relation to posthumous sperm retrieval,154 reveals an attempt by courts to infer 
what the deceased would have wanted in the circumstances.155 Much of the inconsistency in 
                                                          
151 Brundy, ‘Choosing for Another’, n. 45 above, pp. 32-33. 
152 Robertson, ‘Second Thoughts on Living Wills’, n. 95 above, p. 7. 
153 Simana, ‘Creating Life After Death’, n. 63 above, p. 345 
154 Caselaw and discussion at nn. 107-119 above. 
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the outcomes can be accounted for by inconsistency in the weight to be attached to differing 
types of evidence regarding the deceased’s reproductive wishes which is a result of an absence 
of policy guidance from lawmakers. Of course, recourse to the courts is an imperfect solution 
to the problem of consent in these cases as the necessity of obtaining court-orders is time-
consuming, cumbersome formal and expensive.156 Nonetheless, the courts do have expertise 
in weighing evidence from divergent parties and resolving conflicts and gaps in such evidence. 
They are therefore able to protect individual rights by making decisions that would best 
approximate those of the incompetent patient.157  
For example, the courts are well accustomed to dealing with hearsay evidence and the law is 
sufficiently attuned to admit it in certain circumstances; indeed, the hearsay rule has well 
recognised exceptions where the deceased has made declarations in contemplation of death,158 
and where past statements of the deceased are admitted to interpret a will so as to properly give 
effect to their intentions after death.159 Indeed, at times the courts have given legal effect to 
mere verbal statements as to how a deceased intended his property to devolve after death.160 In 
succession law, the courts are willing to be flexible about allowing such statements as evidence 
(in view of the fact that the deceased is clearly no longer available as a witness) as the best 
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(1999) 22 International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 107.  
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means of giving effect to the deceased’s true intentions as to what should happen to their 
property after death.161  
One solution to the issue of consent is to vest decision-making power as to whether posthumous 
use can be made of gametes in a committee acting judicially, with a representative being 
appointed to advocate on behalf of the interests of the deceased.162 This would allow a range 
of factors to be considered properly before a decision is made; namely, the wishes and values 
of the deceased, the motivations of the potential mother and her capacity to raise the resultant 
child, as well as any cultural norms that would militate either for or against posthumous 
reproduction,163 as well as any other factors in the individual case that would bear on the 
decision. The statutory scheme in New Zealand, by way of example, has established an 
advisory committee to develop policy in relation to ART, and an ethics committee which can 
approve non-standard applications for ART on a case-by-case basis.164 Evidence could thus be 
weighed appropriately by an independent body and conflicts of evidence, for example as 
between the surviving partner and family,165 could also be resolved. Empowering such a quasi-
judicial decision-making committee would have the advantages of being a quicker, less formal 
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and less expensive procedure than recourse to the courts. It would also enable the appointment 
of legal and medical experts so that the hearing would retain the benefits of a judicial process.  
There is of course a distinction between applications to authorise posthumous sperm retrieval 
and applications as to its subsequent use. Once human gametes have been retrieved and frozen 
sperm can remain viable for decades.166 There would thus be sufficient time for any such 
hearing to decide whether to authorise use to take place. Applications for posthumous sperm 
retrieval are different and as discussed invariably take place in ‘emergency’ circumstances 
where a judge must decide the application under extreme time constraints without the best 
opportunity to fully consider all of the evidence or the legal implications. These factors 
arguably justify a much less onerous requirement than decisions on use, such as allowing the 
surviving partner to provide consent to posthumous sperm retrieval, as the best means of 
vindicating the autonomy of the deceased.    
Nonetheless, granting power to authorise the use of such retrieved sperm to an independent 
committee would relieve physicians faced with a request for posthumous sperm retrieval from 
the responsibility of facilitating its posthumous use, and the serious and ongoing consequences 
of this for the legacy of the deceased, his existing family, the potential child and society in 
general. This would allow medical bodies and policymakers to focus on the narrower issue of 
delimiting the circumstances when posthumous sperm retrieval is permissible, a far less serious 
issue, and one which could arguably be accommodated by less onerous requirements than the 
prior written and informed consent of the deceased.  
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5. Conclusion  
Posthumous reproduction raises novel and difficult issues of ethics and law. It affects a myriad 
of different interests both in families and society, and for the living, the dead, and the not yet 
alive. It is impossible to judge the harm such procedures might engender, given their newness 
and relative rareness. It is entirely understandable that many jurisdictions exercise caution 
when seeking to regulate this area, with some outlawing it altogether. That said, in the absence 
of clear evidence of harm resulting from allowing posthumous conception, a case can be made 
that it should be facilitated and that a private and social good may come from alleviating the 
grief of a partner and family that invariably follows when a young man dies tragically.  
Adopting requirements for prior explicit informed consent to both posthumous sperm retrieval 
and use in practice serves to exclude the very class of people most likely to benefit from the 
procedure: the surviving partner and family of a young man who has died suddenly and 
unexpectedly. These strict consent requirements serve to vindicate only one aspect of the 
deceased’s autonomy: his capacity for self-determination. The effect of such strict 
requirements, however, is to exclude posthumous conception in many cases where the deceased 
would have wished it.  
On the other extreme, presumed consent to posthumous sperm retrieval is really no consent at 
all and instrumentalizes the dead. One cannot simply adapt the arguments justifying presumed 
consent regimes for organ donation to posthumous conception as they are materially different 
procedures in their effects and implications. Adopting a system of presumed consent would 
detach the decision to reproduce posthumously from the deceased’s autonomy.  
A system of implied or inferred consent offers the best opportunity to vindicate the critical 
interests of the deceased in reproducing or not reproducing after death. Concerns about the 
weight that should be given to evidence of these wishes by the next-of-kin given the potential 
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conflict of interest can be addressed by empowering a quasi-judicial committee to decide on 
use after considering a range of interests and circumstances, on a case-by-case basis. While 
respect for the dead requires the authorization of posthumous sperm retrieval to be put on a 
clear legal footing, this is a much less serious matter than authorising the posthumous use of 
sperm, and a regulatory regime should effectively separate these issues. Given the emergency 
nature of the procedure and its necessity to preserve the possibility of making a subsequent 
application for the authorisation of use of the material, a less onerous form of consent can be 
justified such as allowing the surviving partner to consent to posthumous sperm retrieval on 
behalf of the dead or dying man. In such a two stage regulatory system, medical professionals 
would be relieved of the responsibility of enabling the use of the materials for posthumous 
reproduction by facilitating sperm retrieval for the recently deceased man.  
 
